County Board of Equalization of Wasatch County, State of Utah v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, Stichting Mayflower Fonds, and Utah State Tax Commission : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
County Board of Equalization of Wasatch County,
State of Utah v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational
Fonds, Stichting Mayflower Fonds, and Utah State
Tax Commission : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dan Matthews; Wasatch County Attorney; Bill Thomas Peters; Special Wasatch County Attorney;
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Jan Graham; Attorney General of Utah; Kelly W. Wright; John C. McCarrey; Assistant Attorney
General; Attorneys for Tax Commission; E. Craig Smay; Attorney for Mayflower.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, County Board of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Ponds, No. 960280 (Utah Court of
Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/215
UTAH f 
DOCUMENT 
K F U i 
60 J 
.A10 * 
BfflBF 
D Q C K e T N » ^ / ^ Q ^ V ^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION OF WASATCH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner-Appellants, 
- V b -
STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER FONDS, 
and UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Respondents-Appellees. 
Case No. 960280-CA 
Priority 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF TAX COMMISSION DECISION 
Dan Matthews 
Wasatch County Attorney 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Wasatch County Attorney 
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr. 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-4300 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General of Utah 
Kelly W. Wright 
John C McCarrey 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Tax Commission 
E, Craig Smay 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)539-8515 CI I Cf) 
Attorney for Mayflower • • &*** *«— ft-*' 
SEP 18 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION OF WASATCH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner-Appellants, 
-vs-
STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER FONDS, 
and UTAH STATE TAX j 
COMMISSION, 
Respondents-Appellees. 
Case No. 960280-CA 
Priority 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF TAX COMMISSION DECISION 
Dan Matthews 
Wasatch County Attorney 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Wasatch County Attorney 
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr. 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-4300 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General of Utah 
Kelly W. Wright 
John C. McCarrey 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Tax Commission 
E. Craig Smay 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 539-8515 
Attorney for Mayflower 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of Issues 1 
Standard of Review 1 
Determinative Statutory Provisions I 
Statement of the Case 1 
A. Nature of the case 2 
B/C. Course of proceedings/Disposition by the agency 2 
D. Statement of facts 3 
Summary of Argument 10 
Argument . 12 
1. The Tax Commission Correctly Concluded that Abandonment 
of Agricultural Use was the Issue with Respect to the Bonanza 
Flats Sector of the Mayflower Property 12 
2. Appellees Were Not Required to make a Showing of 
"AUM's" 14 
3. It is Not Appropriate to Double Count the "South Mountains" 
in Determining an "AUM" Requirement 20 
4. The Commission's Findings Are Adequate 23 
5. Appellees Are Not Subject to Penalties 25 
Conclusions 26 
TABLE OF CASES 
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 
858 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1993) 1 
Parsons Asphalt Products v. State Tax Commission, 
617 P.2d 357 (Utah 1980) 13 
Salt Lake County v. State Tax Commission, 
819 P.2d 776 (Utah 1991) 12, 13 
U.S. West Communications v. Public Services Commission, 
882 P.2d 141 (Utah 1994) , 23 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 1 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-610 1 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-503 2, 14 
15 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-506(7) 3 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-506 10, 11 
12,26 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-503(5) 12 
ii-
Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction purusant to §§78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), 78-2-2(4) and 
63-46b-16 Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
Statement of Issues 
1. On a petition to reinstate Farmland Assessment Act ^greenbelt") status of 
a |) | >H I e s' 1 • i ii < i, whether the a idence sustained the finding of no abandonment of agricultural 
use of a small portion, the Bonanza Flat area, of the whole. 
2. If llir llonan/ii Flnt aiea w,ns not to hi intiiyirJ fiom the ^reenbelt despite 
some reduction of agricultural use there, whether the evidence sustained a finding of 
sufficient agricultural use of the entire property. 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review for both issues presented is the same. It is found in Section 
59 1 61 0, I I" C "L (1953)(Supp. 1993). The Court applies a correction of error standard to 
the Tax Commission's conclusions of law, and affirms its findings of fact if supported by 
substantial evidence Insolai as appellant questions liir < 'ommi.ssioif >•. tliinliiij.'s ol l.icl, 
appellant must marshall all evidence supporting such findings, then show that the findings 
were not supported by substantial evidence. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 858 
R2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993). 
Determinative Statutory Provisions 
Provisions in addition to those attached by appellant are attached hereto in Appendix 
"C. 
Statement of the Case 
1 
A. Nature of the case 
This is an appeal of an Order, following rehearing, of the Tax Commission sustaining 
the petition of appellees for re-valuation, and reinstatement of Farmland Assessment Act 
("greenbelt") status, of lands in Wasatch County. 
B/C. Course of proceedings/Disposition by the agency 
The land in issue was accorded greenbelt status in 1985. In 1986-87, substantial parts 
of the property were taken by eminent domain for Jordanelle Reservoir and related 
improvements. In 1992, the greenbelt status of the property was canceled by Wasatch 
County, the property was re-valued, and substantial additional taxes imposed, including a 
rollback tax and penalties. Contemporaneously, the applicable statue, §59-2-503, U.C.A. 
(1953), was amended: "agricultural use" sufficient for greenbelt treatment following 1992 
required a showing of production equal to at least half the average annual production of 
similar lands in the area, rather than the $1,000.00 annual agricultural income previously 
required. 
Appellees petitioned the Wasatch County Board of Equalization to reinstate the 
greenbelt classification and amend the valuation. Despite the recommendation of the 
Hearing Examiner that the property be reinstated (Appendix "A"), the petition was denied. 
A similar petition to the Tax Commission was heard in February, 1995. The 
Commission sustained the petition, ordering re-valuation of the property (as stipulated) and 
reinstatement of greenbelt status. The order was re-affirmed upon petition for rehearing. 
This appeal followed. 
Appellant indicates that on this appeal it raises only the issues whether, applying a 
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post 1992 test, appropriate agricultural use was maintained in a particular corner of one of 
several tax parcels (the "South Mountains") of the property, and whether an alleged failure 
to maintain appropriate use in this area disqualifies the entire property. This appears to 
waive any claim that the whole property did not meet the $1,000.00 annual income test 
applicable through 1992. It also appears to concede that the use of the bulk of the property 
has been sufficient under the post-1992 standard, but to claim that if use has been curtailed 
in an undefined portion of the "South Mountains", devices may be applied to work an 
average insufficiency throughout the property. Since it relies upon an alleged failure of 
agricultural use under the post-1992 standard, it waives any claim for rollback tax: "Land 
that becomes ineligible for farmland assessment solely as a result of amendments to this 
part is not subject to the roll back tax." §59-2-506(7), U.C.A. (1953)(Supp. 1993). 
D. Statement of facts 
The "Mayflower" property at issue in this matter, including what the County chooses 
to call the "South Mountain property," is shown on the Wasatch County tax notices as 
aggregating 3333 acres, but in fact aggregates 3420.5 acres. The latter figure was stipulated 
by the parties, and included in the Tax Commission's Order as stipulated. The Stipulation 
is Appendix "B" hereto. 
The Gilmor family, which has leased the Mayflower property from various owners 
for grazing for decades, owns additional acreage in the vicinity aggregating approximately 
1600 acres, some of which is used for the same grazing operation, except for 40 acres which 
produce crops and are not grazed. Testimony of Luke Gilmor at 68-69, 75. 
The Mayflower property was first given greenbelt status in 1985, though it had been 
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regularly grazed for many years previously. Testimony of Arie Bogerd at 55; Luke Gilmor 
at 5-13. There appears to be no dispute that for 1992 and all prior and subsequent years, 
the Mayflower property produced in excess of $1,000.00 annual agricultural income. 
The southwesterly extension of the property includes slopes of Bald Mountain, which 
rise to alpine meadows which include Bonanza Flat. Testimony of Gilmor at 22-23. Prior 
to 1989, the Bonanza Flat area had been regularly grazed, the sheep and cattle being driven 
up the mountain slopes, and the Gilmors maintaining a sheep camp in the area during 
summers. Following 1989, grazing in the Bonanza Flats area has been reduced because the 
area has been encroached upon by development from Park City. This has subjected the 
area to unauthorized recreational use, and the predations of domestic dogs. Id. at 24-25. 
While sheep and cattle still graze the slopes and canyons on the sides of Bald Mountain, 
when they migrate into the upper meadows, the herdsmen return them to lower areas not 
exposed to the dogs. The sheep camp in the upper area is no longer maintained, but the 
land continues to be leased for grazing by the Gilmors, at a rent reduced to reflect reduced 
useability, and help has been sought from the Wasatch County authorities to control the 
dogs and trespassers in order to resume grazing at former levels. Id. 
Appellant calls the area including the base and slopes of Bald Mountain and the 
upper meadows near Bonanza Flat, all of which it calculates as 1495 acres, the "South 
Mountains". 
In 1992, the greenbelt status of the Mayflower property was canceled by Wasatch 
County. In the same year, the governing statute was modified, to take effect in 1993, by re-
defining "agricultural use" sufficient to obtain greenbelt status. Prior to 1992, agricultural 
4 
properties throughout the Stated had been assigned categories of value for agriculture. 
Grazing lands were designated Graze I, to Graze IV. Testimony of Denny Lytle at 91-96; 
Testimony of Glenn Burgener at 135-136. Though these categories had not previously been 
used to calculate a level of agricultural use sufficient for greenbelt status, in 1992 the Tax 
Commission staff proposed that, in future, they would be, by assigning a required use factor 
("AUM requirement") to each acre of a particular category. Id. Wasatch County, like other 
counties, therefore, sent notices to owners of greenbelted land advising them of the change, 
and allowing them to, among other things, challenge the categories applied to their land if 
inappropriate. Testimony of Glenn Burgener at 130-132, 150-151. Notices were not sent 
to appellees for the Mayflower property, however, on the ground that it was being removed 
from greenbelt, and they were thus neither informed of the changed standard or provided 
opportunity to change their operation or to protest the categories of grazing suitability 
applied to their land. Id. at 131. 
The ground given by the County for cancellation of the greenbelt was the testimony 
of a handful of County employees that they had observed that grazing on the land had 
ceased. (Peculiarly, the greenbelt status of adjoining Gilmor land was not questioned, 
though its agricultural use was the same grazing operation.) Before the County Board of 
Equalization, appellees presented the continuing lease of their property for grazing, with the 
affidavit of their lessee. Id. at 128-129. This satisfied the Hearing Examiner, but was then 
rejected by the Board on the ground that they did not have the lease exhibits. Id. at 152-
153. The County did not then claim that agricultural use had fallen below a post-1992 
standard involving grazing categories and "AUM's". Id. at 129-130. Appellees had no other 
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way of knowing that such a standard was applicable, as it was not adopted by Commission 
rule. 
Upon cross-examination before the Tax Commission, the testimony of County 
employees that grazing had ceased turned out to be based upon occasional chance 
observations from cars passing on a new six lane high-speed freeway, or visits to nearby, but 
different (not greenbelted) properties which did not provide views of the Mayflower 
property. Id. at 306-313; Testimony of LeeRoy Farrell at 396-400. None of this testimony 
concerned the Bonanza Flat area. The usual on-the-ground inventory by trained Tax 
Commission personnel was not performed, and the expedient of calling the owners or the 
family which had grazed the area for decades was overlooked. Testimony of Burgener at 
313-321. The testimony of the County's employees regarding cessation of use appears not 
to have been seriously credited by the Tax Commission. 
Before the Tax Commission, the County relied chiefly upon William Giles, a federal 
employee, whose job in connection with construction of Jordanelle Reservoir kept him in 
the area of the Mayflower property. Testimony of Giles at 217-221. Mr. Giles testified that 
he had not seen sizeable numbers of sheep or cattle on the property despite the fact that, 
as a hunter, he had observed deer and elk on the property, using field glasses, in winter. 
Id. at 230-236. By winter however, grazing has ceased for the year, and he did not use field 
glasses during grazing seasons. (Compare testimony of Luke Gilmor, at 55-59.) Mr. Giles 
agreed that the property was very large, with a very convoluted topography, and heavy 
vegetation, and difficult to observe from the roads he used. Testimony of Giles at 252-257, 
284. Also, he had observed herds of sheep being driven toward or away from the 
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Mayflower property from the adjoining Gilmor property, and he had on at least two 
occasions been involved in complaints of cattle straying off the Mayflower property into the 
adjoining federal property. Id. at 231-232, 238-242. On one occasion, his agency had paid 
to settle a claim of poisoning a substantial number of sheep on the Mayflower property. 
Testimony of Gilmor at 32-33. Mr. Giles* ultimate summary of his testimony was that he 
would not say that the sheep and cattle were not on the Mayflower property, only that he 
had not observed them. Testimony of Giles at 298-299. 
Ultimately, it appears that the Tax Commission did not regard Mr. Giles' testimony 
as inconsistent with that of the herdsman who testified regarding consistent grazing 
throughout the entire period in issue. 
In any case, the claim for which greenbelt status of the property was canceled - that 
grazing had ceased - appears to have been abandoned. The present claim is that the grazing 
which occurred, and which undoubtedly produced $1,000.00 annual income throughout, fell 
below the post-1992 standard in one area; thus, the whole greenbelt should be canceled. 
The herdsman, Luke Gilmor, testified that the property had been used for grazing 
by his family for three generations, and continued to be used as it had in the past 
Testimony of Gilmor at 5-11. This use, following 1986, included annually grazing 
approximately 1500 sheep for a period of four months, and 175 cattle for a period of three 
months. Id. at 13-16, 28, 50-59. These figures fluctuated somewhat year to year, both as 
to number of animals and length of time, depending upon conditions, but represent 
reasonable averages. Operations had been modified to meet changing conditions, such as 
the construction of federal and state improvements on part of the Mayflower land, and the 
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encroachment of development in the Bonanza Flat area. 
Mr. Gilmor pointed out that his family owned approximately 1600 acres in the area, 
40 acres of which was used for crops, and the remainder for general grazing purposes. Id. 
at 68-69, 75. 
Based upon his 40+ years of experience in grazing on the very property, and other 
properties nearby, Mr. Gilmor gave it as his unqualified opinion that historic and present 
grazing use of the Mayflower property was substantially more than half the average use of 
similar grazing properties in the area. Id at 39-40, 44-46, 77-80. 
With respect to the Bonanza Flat area, Mr. Gilmor testified that it was a good 
grazing area, and had been regularly grazed before 1989. The encroachment of recreational 
trespassers and dogs, however, had necessitated curtailment of use thereafter. Id. at 22-24. 
Sheep had not been driven into the area in recent years as they had in the past, though 
sheep, and to a lesser extent cattle, had drifted there on their own. Id. While sheep and 
cattle continued to use the mountain slopes and canyons, if they got into the upper 
meadows, the herdsmen retrieved them to avoid predation by dogs. Id. at 24-25. 
Nevertheless, the area continued to be leased for grazing, because the animals continued 
to use it, though at a reduced rent commensurate with its reduced use. Id. at 25-27. The 
assistance of the Wasatch County authorities had been sought to control dogs and 
trespassers in the hope of restoring the historic level of grazing. Id. 
Denny Lytle, of the Commission staff, testified at the County's request that, under 
a rule of thumb used by the Commission staff, but not adopted by Commission rule, 
whether a grazing property was being used for half its agricultural capacity as required by 
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the revised statute, was measured by calculating "AUM's" (animal unit months). Lytle at 
121, 97-103. Under this rule of thumb, the agricultural capacity of land categorized Graze 
II, such as the great majority of the Mayflower land, is .63 AUM per year per acre. To 
calculate required AUM's, multiply animal units (1 cow = 1 unit; 5 sheep = 1 unit) grazed 
by months grazed. If this figure is more than half the number of acres grazed multiplied 
by .63, the land qualifies. Id. Assuming that the acreage grazed by Mr. Gilmor was 4714 
acres, the required AUM's under the staff method were calculated by Mr. Lytle at 1485 
(4714 times .63 divided by 2 = 1484.91). As the grazing operation described by Mr. Gilmor 
produced 1725 AUM's (1500 sheep = 300 AU's times 4 = 1200 AUM's, plus 175 cows 
times 3 = 525 AUM's; 1200 plus 525 = 1725 AUM's), according to Mr. Lytle, the use was 
ample for greenbelt status. Id. at 100-106. 
Mr. Lytle also testified that he could provide no foundation for the grazing categories 
applied to the Mayflower land, as he had taken no part in assigning or reviewing them, and 
could not vouch for their accuracy as measures of grazing capacity. Id. at 115-116, 198. 
Glenn Burgener, the County Assessor, testified that the categories reflected value rather 
than agricultural capacity. Testimony of Burgener at 135-136. 
In fact, the acreage Mr. Lytle was asked by the County to assume, 4714 acres, was 
not correct. 4714 acres was the County's artificial calculation of an area to which it claimed 
all grazing was confined. Though confused initially, upon rehearing, the Commission 
rejected this claim of the County, and utilized the correct acreage. The Mayflower land, 
including the "South Mountains" area, was stipulated to be 3420.5 acres. Mr. Gilmor 
testified to a further possible 1560 acres grazed, for a total maximum of 4980.5. The 
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AUM's required by the staff for this acreage, applying Mr. Lytle's calculation, would be 
1569, still substantially less than the 1725 AUM's Mr. Lytle calculated based on Mr. 
Gilmor's testimony, and less than the 1590 which the County on this appeal claims was the 
correct calculation based on Mr. Gilmor's testimony (Appellant's Brief at 46-47). 
Summary of Argument 
While a different rule may apply to land which has never been used for agriculture, 
and is attempted to be attached to an agricultural parcel to obtain greenbelt, where land, 
such as the Bonanza Flat area at issue here, has been used for agricultural purposes for 
decades, and continues to be leased for agricultural purposes as part of a single agricultural 
unit, but such use has been necessarily curtailed due to change of conditions beyond the 
control of the owner, the question to be answered, for purposes of continuation of greenbelt 
status, is whether agricultural use has been abandoned and replaced. §59-2-506 U.C.A. 
(1953). It does not show abandonment of agricultural use that intensity of use has 
diminished as a result of conditions beyond the owner's control; nor is it required to show 
continuation of full agricultural use as in the past in order to maintain greenbelt status. 
It is conceded in this case that curtailment of agricultural use in the Bonanza Flat 
area (not in the entire 1495 acres of "South Mountains" as alleged by appellant) has been 
necessitated by a change of conditions beyond the control of the owners or their lessee. In 
that case, the correct standard is not whether agricultural use is presently less than in the 
past, or whether the curtailment of use has been prolonged, but whether the use that has 
occurred is commensurate with the changed conditions, or whether there has been any 
substitution of use or separation of the parcel from agricultural lands with which it had been 
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used in common. The Tax Commission correctly found no abandonment of agricultural use 
in this case.1 
Otherwise, the owner of greenbelted property has no burden to show agricultural use 
under a rule of thumb applied by the Tax Commission staff, but which the Commission has 
not adopted as a rule. While such a showing might (or might not) be sufficient, it is not 
necessary. The burden of the owners under the statute was to show agricultural use of their 
property in excess of half the average use of similar properties nearby ("in excess of 50% 
of the average agricultural production per acre for the given type of land and the given . . 
area") and was carried in this case by the extensive testimony of their lessee regarding 
historic and present grazing on the property, and his amply qualified opinion that more than 
half the grazing capacity of the land had regularly been used. 
The County provided nothing to rebut this evidence. It's evidence of non-use was 
unconvincing. It failed to show that the property had any higher grazing capacity, and this 
was not changed by the fact that there were assigned to the property grazing categories 
which appellees had been denied the opportunity provided others to contest. These 
categories admittedly were affixed to establish a taxable value. The County provided no 
foundation for assuming that the categories assigned appellee's land reflected, or were 
intended to reflect, the capacity of the land for grazing. In any case, assuming that the 
"Graze" categories assigned appellees' land were justifiable, and applying the staffs rule of 
thumb for calculating "AUM's", the agricultural use of appellee's property was amply 
The applicable statute, §59-2-506, omitted from Appendix A 
of the County's brief, indicates that abandonment of agricultural 
use occurs where land is "applied to a use other than agricultural 
or is otherwise withdrawn from the provisions of this part. . . " 
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sufficient for greenbelt status. 
Argument 
1. The Tax Commission Correctly Concluded that Abandonment of Agricultural Use 
was the Issue with Respect to the Bonanza Flats Sector of the Mayflower Property. 
Generally, to show entitlement to greenbelt status, an owner must show agricultural 
use commensurate with the agricultural capacity of the land. See Salt Lake County v. State 
Tax Commission, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah 1991). It is not necessary, however, to show 
uniformity of use throughout or even that all included areas are regularly and profitably 
used. Id. The statute must be accorded rational flexibility. Id. 
Further, the showing necessary to establish greenbelt status, and that to maintain it 
once established, do not appear to be identical. For greenbelt status to terminate, it must 
appear that land previously in agricultural use is now "applied to a use other than 
agricultural, or is otherwise withdrawn from the provision of this part." §59-2-506, U.C.A. 
(1953). While the present statutory formula - "in excess of 50% of the average agricultural 
production per acre for the given type of land and the given county or area" - is new and 
untested, it would appear to be self-adjusting for local area conditions, such as drought, or 
flood, or increased predation, which depress productivity. The "average production" 
standard does not appear to impose a rigid, unchanging qualification. The statute allows, 
in fact, for wholesale waiver of the production requirement where failure to meet it is due 
to no fault of the owner. §59-2-503(5), U.C.A. (1953). It would appear, therefore, that a 
finding that land previously in greenbelt has been "applied to a use other than agricultural" 
would have to be supported by facts other than that intensity of agricultural use in one area 
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had declined due to natural conditions beyond the owner's control. This is in accord with 
the "liberality" of construction traditionally accorded tax measures. Parsons Asphalt 
Products v. State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 357, 398 (Utah 1980). 
Insofar as Wasatch County does not question that the migration of domestic dogs 
into the Bonanza Flat area of appellee's property necessitates reduction of grazing, and that 
the condition is beyond appellee's control (or, apparently, the control of the responsible 
Wasatch County authorities) it is inappropriate for the County to argue laboriously that 
appellees have failed to show appropriate agricultural use because present use is not 
comparable to prior use. While the case might be different if the Bonanza Flats area had 
never been grazed, and were simply tacked onto grazing lands to get favorable tax treatment 
(Salt Lake County v. State Tax Commission, supra), a reduction in historic use 
commensurate with changed conditions beyond the owner's control does not appear to 
offend the Supreme Court's rule of "liberality and common sense". Id. at 779. 
Further, it is inappropriate for the County to claim that, as the formerly regular 
grazing in certain upper meadows has been curtailed, as the evidence showed in this case, 
agricultural use has ceased in the entire 1485 acre tax parcel of which the meadows are a 
small part, along with mountain slopes and canyons. The evidence showed that the slopes 
and canyons continued to be used as in the past 
The Tax Commission applied the appropriate rule. It held that "while it is clear that 
there has been a reduced agricultural usage of a portion of the south main property which 
occurred in either 1987 or 1989, the Commission cannot find that there has been a change 
of use in the property." Order 8-25-95 at 15. The affected sector of the property continues 
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to be leased with the larger agricultural unit of which it is part, and to be used for 
agricultural purposes to the extent it can be. No other use has intervened. That is 
sufficient to maintain the greenbelt status. 
2. Appellees Were Not Required to make a Showing of "AUM's". 
The County canceled appellees' greenbelt under the 1992 standard for agricultural 
use, upon grounds which have been disproven, and which the County now abandons. Based 
upon the improper cancellation, it denied appellants notice of the standard they would be 
required to meet in future, and opportunity to meet it, or to contest its application to their 
land. The County now complains that appellees failed to meet the new standard, if rigidly 
applied, in one area, and that this justifies cancellation of the entire greenbelt, a roll back 
tax, and penalties. 
The County appears to have assumed that it was appellees' burden to show adequate 
agricultural use of their land under the "AUM" rule of thumb. The Tax Commission may 
also have so assumed. 
In fact, appellees had no such responsibility. 
Under Section 59-2-503, greenbelt treatment is authorized for land "actively devoted 
to agricultural use," which "means that the land produces in excess of 50% of the average 
agricultural production per acre for the given type of land and the given county or area." 
The section also provides, however: 
(b) For the purpose of determining production levels for a given 
county or area and a given type of land the first applicable of the following 
established authorities shall be used: 
(i) production levels reported in the current publication 
of the Utah Agricultural Statistics; 
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(ii) current crop budgets developed and published by 
Utah State University; and 
(iii) other acceptable standards of agricultural production 
designated by the commission by rule adopted in accordance 
with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act 
None of the statutory indices of "production levels" listed in subsection (b)(i), (ii) or (iii) 
were available through the Tax Commission hearing in this matter. See Testimony of 
Denny Lytle, at 120-121. The Commission staffs "AUM" methodology had not been 
adopted by the Commission by rule. Id. at 121. Landowners whose greenbelt status was 
attacked in this period were left to their own devices to show 50% of average agricultural 
production. 
Even had appellees had notice of, or opportunity to discover, the AUM method, they 
were not required to make a showing of AUM's because that method had not been adopted 
by the Tax Commission by rule. Indeed, had they attempted to do so, it might have been 
claimed that the showing was inadequate, for the same reason. 
As they were not apprised of the AUM method until near the time of the Tax 
Commission hearing, appellees chose to proceed by showing the expert opinion of their 
lessee. As it turned out, this was also the method adopted by many counties, which asked 
lessees and owners to file "recertification applications" stating their opinions. Testimony of 
Glenn Burgener, at 130-132 and Ex. 105; Testimony of Denny Lytle at 138. That method 
was plainly permissible and adequate in the circumstances, and if such opinion was founded 
on detailed evidence and extensive knowledge and experience, such as Mr. Gilmor's, plainly 
carried appellees' burden with respect to agricultural use. Wasatch County did not perform 
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a single investigation of properties for which "recertification applications" were received. 
Testimony of Burgener at 132. 
The function of the County's application of the AUM method in this case was to 
rebut Mr. Gilmor's evidence. This means two things. First, the question on appeal is not 
whether appellees demonstrated the correct number of AUM's produced by grazing on their 
land; it is whether any number of required AUM's shown by appellant was persuasive that 
Mr. Gilmor's view was wrong. Second, it was the County's burden to lay an appropriate 
foundation for the application of an AUM requirement to appellee's greenbelt. As the 
County plainly failed to lay an appropriate foundation, it failed to show any number of 
required AUM's. 
Appellant attempts to proceed by showing that AUM's required for appellees' land 
exceeded AUM's produced by appellees' usage. It failed, however, to show AUM's 
required. 
Calculation of AUM's required (as distinguished from AUM's produced) applies two 
central criteria. The first is a classification of the grazing (or other agricultural) capacity 
of the land in issue. Grazing lands are categorized "Graze I" to "Graze IV11 in descending 
quality. Testimony of Lytle at 91. The second is a number quantifying the comparative 
capacity of lands in different categories. The quantifier for "Graze II" lands is .63 (which 
compares to 1.14 for "Graze I" land, etc.). When the number of acres involved is multiplied 
by the numerical quantifier, the result is the grazing capacity, half of which is the "AUM 
requirement" Id. at 97-100. That is, 200 acres of Graze II land has an AUM requirement 
of 63 (200 times .63 = 126 divided by 2 = 63). 
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To calculate the annual AUM production of a piece of land, multiply the number of 
animals grazed there ("animal units") during the year by the number of months grazed (to 
get "animal unit months", "AUM's"). Id. at 97-100. Animals are weighted according to 
forage consumption. One cow (with calf) is 1 unit Five sheep (with lambs) is one unit 
Id. A parcel which grazes 100 cows for 4 months in a year, has an AUM production of 400. 
This is adequate if half the product of the number of acres and the numerical quantifier for 
that category of land is less than 400. Id. at 102-103. 
Here, there was ample evidence of the number of animals, number of months, and 
number of acres grazed. There was adequate foundation for calculating AUM production 
for appellee's land. Foundation was lacking for calculating an AUM requirement 
Appellant needed to show both a foundation for the grazing categories assigned to 
appellees' land, and for the numerical quantifies derived for each such category. If, for 
example, land is categorized Graze I, which, based on its actual grazing capacity, should 
properly be categorized Graze III, the resulting calculations will be wholly unreliable. 
Testimony of Lyttle at 115-116; 131-135. While a foundation for the numerical quantifiers 
might consist of a statistical study of production of lands throughout the State (see 
Testimony of Lytle at 117), a foundation for the grazing categories applied must consist of 
particularized evidence of the land in question. Here, the County wholly failed to provide 
any foundation for the grazing categories it used to perform AUM calculations for 
appellees' land. 
Here the evidence showed that grazing categories were affixed to appellees' land in 
the distant past, for the apparent purpose of valuation. Testimony of Burgener at 135-36. 
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That is, it appears to have been assumed that "Graze I" land would sell for more than 
"Graze II" land, and this apparently assisted in setting taxable values. Id. 
No one who participated in establishing the categories for appellees' land, however, 
testified, and the witness who did testify had never reviewed the categories applied to 
appellee's land, and could not give evidence of their accuracy or propriety. Testimony of 
Lytle, at 173. He conceded, moreover, in response to questions from Commissioner 
Pacheco and appellees, that wide variations in the topography, gradients and water supply 
throughout appellees' property, suggested that its nearly uniform categorization as "Graze 
II" over several thousand acres, might involve mistakes. Id. at 115-116. 
Apparently, the County, and perhaps the Commission, thought this deficiency in the 
proof cured by the fact that appellees had not contested the grazing categories applied to 
their land before the County Board of Equalization, and, therefore, could not do so before 
the Commission. See Testimony of Lytle at 116. A party may be bound by a jurisdictional 
fact without more, if he has been provided appropriate opportunity to contest it and has 
failed to do so. 
The uncontested evidence here, however, is that appellees were denied the notice 
and opportunity to contest the grazing categories for their land which was admittedly 
provided all other owners of greenbelted land in Wasatch County. 
When the statute defining agricultural use was amended, and the Commission staff 
developed the AUM method, the counties sent notices to greenbelt owners of the change 
in the law, which, if pursued would have shown that, in 1993 and thereafter, the grazing 
categories appearing in greenbelt owners' tax notices would be determinative of calculations 
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of agricultural use of their lands, for purposes of maintaining the greenbelt Wasatch 
County owners \ui• uiliMii1 1 1h.il U flu ) \h i1;!,' 'In1 < jlrj "firs then''>fnir npphr'* di 
their land inappropriate in this context, they could contest them. Testimony of Burgener 
at 150-151. These notices were sent by Wasatch County 
greenbelted after 1992. Id at 130-131. They were not sent to appellees (Id. at 131) because 
the County had decided to terminate appellees' greenbelt in 1992. Id. 
Whe appellee's greenbelt, its announced reason for doing so 
was that County employees had observed that grazing of appellee's land had ceased. NFo 
claim was made that grazing i w J slain hi < i I u s< • «i I n | n m pyd,< mg categories for 
the land. Indeed, it was the County's position that such a standard had never come into 
play for appellees' land. Having not received the notice provided others, appellees nun Id 
not have discovered the existence of the AUM methodology, because, though they may be 
presumed to have known of the amendment to the statute, that mentions only methods 
a Commission's rules in this regard disclosed nothing. 
Appellees had no basis for contesting the grazing categories applied to their land 
before the County Board nl I'IJIMIIAIIIMI 1 h\ iv VJ" IT ILII . Vi , ,r > •• "!i^  « in Mi, I f!f*\st 
categories affected any pertinent issue. They proceeded by proffering the affidavit of their 
lessee, and a copy of the lease, to show that the land continued 
This satisfied the hearing examiner. While it did not satisfy the Board of Equalization, that 
was not upon the ground that the grazing shown fell below a disclosed standard, but 
the gi c HI in i lM ;t the Cc imty declined to accept the evidence that any grazing had occurred. 
In short, while it may have been possible to contest the grazing categories before the 
County Board, they were not in issue there. Appellees were denied any notice that the 
significance of the grazing categories on their tax notices had changed fundamentally, and 
in a way which should be contested. No one is to blame for that but the County. It cannot 
take advantage of appellees' silence in the circumstances to estop appellees from pointing 
out that there is no basis in the evidence here for assuming that the grazing categories 
applied to appellee's land bear any relationship to its actual grazing capacity. 
Appellees were not estopped to contest the foundation for the grazing categories 
applied in this case. Appellant provided no foundation. Appellees' objection to application 
of the AUM method was well taken. (See appellee's closing, Tr. 419-422.) 
Had appellees chosen to show appropriate agricultural use by the AUM method 
appellant would have been estopped to deny the grazing categories applied to appellants' 
land. On the other hand, without foundation, such grazing categories were not a basis for 
asserting an AUM requirement. The most the AUM calculation provided in this case could 
do was to support appellee's position. That is, we know, as a result, that grazing on 
appellees' land produces 1725 AUM's per year, and that if the County's grazing categories 
are right, this is more than adequate. Nothing else can be shown by this method. 
Finally, of course, the County's present quibbles about AUM's do not in any way 
contest the Commission's finding that for 1992 and prior years grazing operations on the 
Mayflower property (including the "South Mountains") produced in excess of $1,000.00 
annual income. 
3. It is Not Appropriate to Double Count the "South Mountains" in Determining an "AUM" 
Requirement. 
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For purposes of showing whether appellees made appropriate agricultural use of their 
land, Wasat< In ( mini} J'Aul Mi I ill* < Il lln t 'nmmiv.mii <l ill I iln 1I,,MII llnii^ ii.imrlv, 
compute the "AUM's" resulting from the grazing testified to by Mr. Gilmor, and, compute 
the "A I JM' s" that would -be required for a parcel of 4 / 1 4 acres of "Graze II" land. 
The 4714 acre figure was the dimension calculated by the County for a "peanut" 
shaped area where, the County claimed, all of the grazing had taken place. The j v 
I oiiitniv-ioii i|iiilr [)IIH|M IIII'I, iHp]iTtril llir < "oini(y\ rl,iims about all grazing taking place in 
the "peanut" (Order 2-9-96 at 4-5), and the County does not attempt to revive them on this 
appe< 
however, affect the calculation of 1725 AUM's for the grazing done by Mr. Gilmor. 
Following rejection of the "peanut1, to calculate an AUM requiremei appellee 1 
it would remain simply to define the proper number of acres for which appellees must show 
appropriate use, to determine the required number of AUM's for such acreage, and to 
nun p. in:" (a 1 i/?*; 
The County claims that the correct number of acres is 4714 plus 1495 for the "South 
Moui 
requirement of 1956. Since, however, the Tax Commission on rehearing has determined 
that the 4714 acre figure is meaningless, and then* is litei ally m i rviiiciiu nil I.IIIIIII , i i M II 
alteration of use in most of the 1495 acres of the "South Mountains", this calculation cannot 
be correct." 
The County stipulated that the entire Mayflower property, including the "South 
Mountains", is 3420.5 acres. The County now says that this was only for valuation purposes, 
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not for calculating AUM's. If the County were right about that, it would be bound by the 
acreage shown on its tax notices, which aggregates, for the entire property including the 
South Mountains, 3333 acres. To that figure would be added the Gilmor family acreage 
grazed, a maximum of 1560 acres. There is no evidence that any further acreage was 
grazed, except to the extent that grazing animals were sometimes driven across intervening 
parcels belonging to others, or strayed into them and were brought back. The appropriate 
total is, therefore, 4980.5 or 4893, whether configured in the shape of a "peanut" or 
something else. 
With very minor exceptions, the Mayflower property is classified by the County 
"Graze II". While the exceptions could be calculated separately, the result would be a 
slightly lesser AUM requirement than results from treating the property as uniformly Graze 
II. For simplicity the Tax Commission used an average of Graze II. Had a proper basis 
been shown for the Graze II categorization, the requirement for 4980.5 acres is 1569 AUM's 
(4980.5 times .63 divided by 2 = 1568.86), substantially less than the 1725 calculated for the 
grazing which occurred, and less even than the 1590 AUM's which the County now argues 
was correct (Appellant's Brief, p. 47) despite its own witness. 
The calculation of AUM's now proposed by the County for 6209 acres effectively 
double counts the entire acreage of the "South Mountains", and is obviously improper. 
It does not appear improper, however, to argue that the present limitations on use 
of the Bonanza Flat portion of the "South Mountains" lowers the grazing category for this 
area. If it was properly Graze II, it is now nearer Graze IV, with a dramatic lowering of 
the required AUM's. In fact, it is only if you apply an inappropriately high AUM 
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requirement r the "South Mountain" acres, and double count them, that any of the 
( "<i " H i II I y" s «f i i \\ i n i 11 v in in I,"-., in 11 „ 11", mi" .; mi in in II II in in in in '" II i<" s<l ii se. 
4 The Commission's Findings Are Adequate 
I In "I 'muiiit) souglil idii'dini!' mi llliis m.illi'i ii[ 11 in I lln I'm mid liul (M| nil inn • iillbjiiillnJ 
by the County had mislead the Tax Commission into accepting an inappropriate calculation 
or MJs propounded by the County. Upon rehearing, the Commissi* n 
County's presentation had been misleading, but that a con ect calculation of i\ I JM's 
demonstrated that appellee's agricultural use was more than adequate. The Commission 
Hi "i I" (HI i111 c" i "1 in I I  HI 'ill il "lmi(i(ii>(« its rn lmp , T i n 1 < ' o m i t y n o w c o m p l a i n s t h a t t h e r e s u l t o f a l l t h i s 
is that the Commission's findings are inadequate. 
I I i r , s i 1 1 I ' K i i • i ii mi ii I i t I mi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 g h J I I H III I 1 1 1 1 1 II 11 1 II ) 11 ( I n II 'i II II 1 * mi in mi in i II i y 1 1 < i M .' i o ( 1 1 II * mi II mi I II mi mi
 (li in II in II I 
to permit ready application of the law by the reviewing court. U.S. West Communications 
v. Public Services Commission. 882 P.2d 14J, IIS (I \U\\\ l(w 11 
The County had attempted to show that Mr, Gilmor's informal drawing of the 
general area in which "most" of his grazing took place, despite his disavowal of accuracy, was 
a precise ai ea in \ vhich all grazing had occurred. The County 
employed its own devices (see testimony of Don Wood) to calculate the specific acreage of 
grazing done by Mr. Gilmor, as compared to a requirement for the 4714 acres allegedly 
grazed If the purpose of lliis w.i; mil I i iiuluir rniilusioii, mil lemmiis nbsciin Mi 
Commission in its initial Order apparently took the 4714 acre figure to be the 3420 
Mayflower acreage, plus the Gilmor family acreage about which there had been evidence 
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(grazing on some part of a 1600 acre tract, of which 40 acres was in crops). 
When Mr. Lytle's calculation showed 1725 AUM's, more than the 1485 needed for 
4714 acres, the County claimed that as Mr. Gilmor's description of the area most grazed 
omitted (sensibly) part of the area the County calls the "South Mountains", the Commission 
should conclude that the additional acreage of the "South Mountains" , 1495 acres, had 
sustained no grazing, and should be added to the 4714 acre figure, to aggregate 6209 acres 
with a requirement of 1956 AUM's. 
Upon rehearing, the Commission quite properly rejected the County's deceptive 
claim about a "peanut" shaped area of 4714 acres. While the order on rehearing does not 
incorporate a specific re-calculation of AUM's, it is plain that the Commission adopted the 
re-calculation presented by appellees. At that point, the Mayflower acreage grazed (3420.5) 
was stipulated, the additional maximum Gilmor acreage grazed (1600 - 40 in crops = 1560) 
was in evidence, and the method of calculation (acreage x .63/2 = AUM's) was agreed. The 
Commission quite correctly observed that the 1725 AUM's calculated by the County's 
witness was ample for the highest total acreage, assuming that it was properly categorized 
Graze II, and might even have been adequate had the Commission accepted the County's 
acreage claim, and had the County shown the grazing category of all of the acreage it 
claimed. 
The Commission's findings were plainly adequate to disclose the evidentiary basis of 
the ruling, and to permit application of the law. 
The County complains also that in finding an inadequate showing of additional acres 
for which the County claims appellees were responsible to show AUM's, and the grazing 
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category of such lands, the Commission placed an improper burden on the County. In fact, 
the entire A U M calculation was properly the County's burden, since it was offei ed t ::»i ebi it 
appellee's showing through Mr. Gilmor that their property had been grazed more than half 
the average for similar properties nearby. 
Cei tainl) once • appellees 1 lad obtained from the Coi rnty' s witness a calculation of 
1725 AUM's produced by grazing on appellees' land, against a maximum requirement of 
l ^ f ) 1 ) U II \<l i II mi I I K I ilLiivlllliii'i mi i i i n l ( milium mi in i c t p , llim I M I I I I I ill ml ' i r b m il lul l h II i n mini illllim 
County to demonstrate its claim of grazing of a sufficient number of additional acres, < -
sufficient grazing category, as to produce sufficient additional required < 
the difference between 1725 and 1569. A showing that some additional acres belonging to 
others might have been grazed inadvertently, was inadequate. 
In fact, the Tax Commission could not have based a ruling against the greenbelt in 
this case on any A U M calculation presented by the County, because the County failed to 
only was its application different in this case than in all other cases of similarly situated 
owners - because appellees were denied opportunity to contest the grazing categorization 
of their land - but, lacking such a contest, there was no evidentiary basis for assuming that 
the categories applied were correct Mr. Lytle could provide nothing to support them. The 
method was wholly unreliable, and, upon appellees' objections, should have been stricken. 
5 Appellees Are Not Subject to Penalties 
i\'. affiniilttiiil MM1 nil liim "Sftiilli MmiiilMii*" l i n n n rased appellees 
penalized for failure to advise the County that it had. Even supposing, however, that some 
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technical failure of agricultural use had occurred, it would not appear that appellees could 
be subject to the penalty provided in §59-2-506, U.C.A. (1953). 
That section speaks of land which is "applied to a use other than agriculture or is 
otherwise withdrawn from the provisions of this part." It does not appear that one who in 
good faith believes he has continued agricultural use can be subject to the penalty, especially 
where he is, at least initially, sustained in his belief by the Tax Commission. 
Moreover, it is plain from Mr. Gilmor's testimony that he did notify the County 
authorities that dogs in the Bonanza Flat area were forcing a reduction in grazing, when he 
asked them, unsuccessfully, for help in coping with the problem. Though this must have 
occurred in 1989 or earlier, it does not appear to have suggested to the County any failure 
of agricultural use prior to 1992. 
Finally, as the predicate of the County's claim of failure to notify them of cessation 
of grazing is an alleged failure to meet the post-1992 AUM test, fundamental fairness would 
seem to require that the landowner be given notice of the test he must meet, and 
opportunity to meet it, before he can be required to announce a failure to meet the test. 
Here the County claims that, having been denied notice of the appropriate test, and 
opportunity to alter operations, or even the boundaries of the greenbelt, to meet the test, 
appellees are to be penalized for failure to announce an alleged inability to meet the test. 
Conclusions 
It appears that the County has, appropriately, abandoned its claim of cessation of 
agricultural use of the Mayflower properties. It attempts to rely instead upon a claim that, 
under a rigidly applied staff rule of thumb, use has diminished sufficiently in one corner of 
26 
the property as to justify wholesale cancellation of the greenbelt 
In fact, there has been insufficient reduction of agricultural use to constitute change 
of use, or to justify cancellation of any part of the greenbelt Otherwise, agricultural use 
DI IIIIM* wliolc |!m»[]fi1i, i' min(Imi 111,! in inir<|iMlr li»i pcnibfH under the AUM method, even 
if it is assumed that the County has applied the correct grazing categories to the land. 
Dated t h i s / / ^3a> nl Scplcinbn, ll)% ' ^") 
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney for j Stichting Mayflower 
Recreational Fonds, and Stichting 
Mayfldwer Mountain Fonds / 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct gppy of the foregoing "BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES" to be mailed, postage prepaid, this /V^tlay of September, 1996 to the 
following: 
Dan Matthews 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Stree, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John McCarrey 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-^ 
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APPENDIX "A 
l ^ A l i -I 1 ' I I *•" 
*LL -*- *x . v.*. .* 
JZXpKCD: 
PETE A. COLEMAN 
WASi^rCH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
25 North Mali 
BOARD OF C0UN1 V COMMISSIONERS 
J. MORONI BESENDORFER, CHAIRMAN T. U\REN PROVOST 
September 14, 1993 
MayFlower 
%Dan Matta 
331 Rio Grande St. Suite #308 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dear Appellai it, 
RE: PROPERTY SERIAL NUMBER: OWC~00r 5- 0 012-C24, OWC-0010-0-013-024, 
OWC-0028-0-024-024, OWC-0029-0-025-024, OWC-0029-1-025-024, OWC-0030-3-
025-024, OWC-0031-0-026-024, OWC-0131-4-026-024, OWC-0031-5-026-024, 
OWC-0031-6-026-024, OWC-0040-0-033-024, OWC-0051-0-034-024, OWC-0052-0-
035-024, OWC-0053-0-036-024, OWC-0075-0-007-025, OWC-0103-0-018-025, OWC 
0110-0-019-025, OWC-0151-0-030-025, OWC-0151-2-030-025, OWC-0153-1-031-
025, OWC-0196-0-012-033, OWC-0198-0-002-034, OWC-0199-0-003-034, OWC-
0201-0-004-034 
After careful consideration, your pe tition, to the county Board o± 
Equalization, requesting a reduction in the taxable valuation of the 
property listed under the above serial number for the year of 1 993 wn* 
denied. 
For further consideration oi i the above property, you may appeal ^ 
the Utah State Tax commission through the respective County Auditor 
within ten days, exclusive of weekends and holidays, of the date of this 
letter. This can be accomplished by obtaining the appeal form TC-240 
from the Auditor's office, filling it out in duplicate for each serial 
number appealed, attaching all required information, and returning the 
completed appeal forms to the auditor for processing* The County 
Auditor will then forward the completed appeal forms to the Utah State 
Tax Commission and the appeal process will be set in motion. 
Respectfully, 
fCH COUNTY OF EQUALIZATION 
/tfVfrv* 
feloner J.^ffareni B e s e n d ^ r f e r , Chairman 
\\^hrTl (_j^rta^i^ ___ 
Commissioner Pi Col ema 
Wffcfo 
Commissioner T. LaRen Pirovost 
CLERK AUDTTOR 
EVERLY ERCANBRACX 
RECORDER SURVEYOR 
JOE DEAN HUBER 
SHERIFF 
MKE SPANOS 
ASSESSOR 
OJENCBURGENER 
TREASURER ATTORNEY JUSTICE COURT JUDGE n 
WASATCH COUNTY - 1993 BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
RECORD OF FINAL DECISION AND AUTHORIZATION 
Parcel Number 
Adjusted Values 
Land"7?AA 
Improvements 
Total Value 
Mayflower 
Pre-Board 
Market 
Appeal Number 
j Equalized 
Market 
59 
0 0 
DENIED 
Pie-Board 
Taxable 
Equalized 
Taxable 
0 
0 
0 ! 
- i 
o ! 
- I 
o i 
Explanation to Support Board's Final Decision 
Appellant provides a lease agreement indicating that subject properties are under FAA. 
Assessor has assessed a roll-back tax on these parcels with the exception of the East Park lots. 
Appellant questions the increased value in the East Park lots but fails to produce evidence 
to substantiate claim for reduction. The other agricultural values are challenged as well, and 
appellant fails to present evidence to refute assessors values. The preponderence of the 
evidence is in favor of the respondent, and therefore the burden of proof has not shifted. 
Recommend denial on a value change on the subject properties. The appellant has shifted 
the burden of proof indicating that the subject properties have a valid lease agreement 
allowing the benefit of FAA status. Recommend that the rollback taxes be abated at this time. 
Board Authorized Signature (or County Seal) 
Ron Perry 
Date Signed 
August 23, 1993 
APPENDIX "B" 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, AND 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
MOUNTAIN FONDS, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
STIPULATION 
Appeal Nos. 93-1672 to 93-1695 
and 93-1784 to 93-1811 
Serial Nos. See attached 
Tax Type: Property 
The parties hereto, by and through their counsel of record, 
stipulate and agree that, insofar as the Commission deems 
appropriate to determine values for the subject properties for the 
year 1993, it may use the tax serial numbers, acreage and lot 
amounts, and values shown on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
This Stipulation is executed in compromise of disputed claims 
concerning the valuation and acreage size of petitioners' property, 
It is intended to set valuation and acreage size for the 1993 tax 
year only. It is not intended, nor should it be interpreted as an 
admission of either the petitioners or respondent concerning any 
legal or factual issue. This Stipulation and the valuation and 
acreage size contained herein shall not be used as evidence in any 
proceeding except an action to enforce its terms. Petitioners and 
respondent expressly reserve the righc to raise any legal or 
factual issues with respect to valuation and acreage size in any 
other proceeding. The Commission's adoption of this stipulation 
will not constitute approval of any legal or factual issue. 
DATED THIS / ^ ' d aY o f March, 1995. 
E. Craig Smay, Esq. 
Attorney for Retitione 
"Jose^ li T. Dunbeck 
Attorney for Respondent 
VALUES PER ACRE/LOT, AND TOTAL VALUES AS OF 1/1/93 
NORTH PROPERTY 
0.71 acres $ 2.00 
656.46 acres $1,500.00 $984,690.00 
EAST PARK LOTS 
25 Lots $12,000.00 
1 Lot $23,000.00 $ 323,000.00 
SOUTH MAIN WITHIN THE DENSITY DETERMINATION 
1,268.23 $3,400.00 $4,311,982.00 
SOUTH MAIN WITHOUT THE DENSITY DETERMINATION 
1,390.11 $1,100.00 $1,529,121.00 
105.00 $ 900.00 
1,495.11 
TOTAL 
$ 
£ i 
£L 
9 4 , 
, 6 2 3 , 
2 4 3 , 
, 5 0 0 . 
, 6 2 1 . 
2 9 5 . 
. 0 0 
. 0 0 
. 0 0 
Tax S e r i a l Numbers ACRES 
NORTH PROPERTY 
OWC-0027-5-024-024 .32 
OWC-0027-4-024-024 .39 
0.71 
OWC-0075-0-027-025 234.71 
OWC-0075-1-007-025 . 4.00 
OWC-0005-0-012-024 108.00 
OWC-0010-0-013-024 287.75 
OWC-0010-4-013-024 4.00 
OWC-0103-0-018-025 16.00 
OWC-0103-1-018-025 2.00 
656.46 
SOUTH PROPERTY WITHIN DENSITY DETERMINATION 
OWC-0052-0-035-024 172.89 51% OF 339.00 
OWC-0031-5-026-024 55.00 
OWC-0031-4-026-024 85.00 
OWC-0031-0-026-024 87.73 
OWC-0031-6-026-024 39.77 
OWC-0029-1-025-024 125.00 
OWC-0029-0-025-024 419.64 
OWC-0030-3-025-024 14.25 
OWC-0030-1-025-024 2.10 
OWC-0053-0-036-024 16.00 
OWC-0028-0-024-024 92.97 
OWC-0030-4-025-024 3.75 
OWC-0153-1-031-025 28.00 
OWC-0151-0-030-025 49.25 
OWC-0151-2-030-025 2.92 
OWC-0110-0-019-025 73.96 
1268.23 
MOUNTAIN PROPERTY OUTSIDE DENSITY DETERMINATION 
OWC-198-0-002-034 226.00 
OWC-199-0-003-034 315.00 
OWC-0201-0-004-034 165.00 
OWC-0203-0-006-034 65.00 
OWC-0202-0-005-034 6.00 
OWC-0040-0-033-024 275.00 
OWC-0051-0-034-024 237.00 
OWC-0052-0-035-024 166.11 49% of 339.00 
OWC-0196-0-012-033 40.00 
1,495.11 
Insert in Stipulation. 
This Stipulation is executed in compromise of disputed claims 
concerning the valuation and acreage size of petitioners' property. 
It is intend to set valuation and acreage size for the 1993 tax 
year only. It is not intended, nor should it be interpreted as an 
admission of either the petitioners or respondent concerning any 
legal or factual issue. This Stipulation and the valuation and 
acreage size contained herein shall not be used as evidence in any 
proceeding except an action to enforce its terms. Petitioners and 
respondent expressly reserve the right to raise any legal or 
factual issue with respect to valuation and acreage size in any 
other proceeding. The Commission's adoption of this stipulation 
will not constitute approval of any legal or factual issue. 
APPENDIX "C 
RoIIbacK tax — x c u « i v 
Lien — Computation of tax — Procedure — Col-
lection — Distribution [Effective January 1, 
1993], 
(1) If land which is or has been in agricultural use, and is or has beer 
valued, assessed, and taxed under this part, is applied to a use other than 
agricultural or is otherwise withdrawn from the provisions of this part, it is 
subject to an additional tax referred to as the "rollback tax," and the owner 
shall within 180 days after the change in land use notify the county assessor 
of the change in land use and pay the rollback tax 
(2) Failure of the owner to notify the county assessor of a change in land 
use within 180 days, and failure to pay rollback taxes imposed by this section 
after notification by the assessor that rollback taxes are due, subjects the 
owner to a penalty of 100% of the rollback tax due 
(3) Upon receipt of the notice, the county assessor shall have the following 
statement recorded by the county recorder "On (date) this land became sub-
ject to the rollback tax imposed by Section 59-2-50G " 
(4) The rollback tax is a hen upon the land until paid and is due and 
payable at the time of the change in use 
(5) The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by 
computing the difference between the tax paid while the land was valued 
under this part and that which vvould have been paid had the property not 
been valued under this part The county treasurer shall collect the rollback 
tax and certify to the county recorder that the rollback tax hen on the prop-
erty has been satisfied 
(6) (a) The assessment of the rollback tax imposed by Subsection (1) the 
at tachment of the hen for these taxes, and the right of the owner or other 
interested party to review any judgment of the county board of equaliza-
tion affecting the rollback tax shall be governed by the procedures pro-
vided for the assessment and taxation of real property not valued, as-
sessed, or taxed under this part 
(b) The rollback tax collected shall be paid into the county treasury and 
paid by the treasurer to the various taxing units pro rata in accordance 
with the levies for the current year 
(7) Land that becomes ineligible for farmland assessment solely as a result 
of amendments to this part is not subject to the rollback tax Any other change 
in land use or withdrawal of land from the provisions of this part, whether 
voluntary or involuntary, subjects the land to the rollback tax 
(8) Land which becomes exempt from taxation under Article XIII, Sec 2 
Utah Constitution, is not considered withdrawn from this part if the land 
continues to be used for agricultural purposes 
History: C 1953, 59-5-91, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 180, § 6; L. 1973, ch. 137, § 3; re-
numbered by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 108; 1987, ch. 
74, § 1; 1992, ch. 235, § 4. 
Amended effective January 1, 1993. — 
Laws 1992, ch 235 amends this section, § 6 of 
the act provides "This act takes effect for tax-
able years beginning on or after January 1, 
1993 " 
Amendment Notes . — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective J anua ry 1, 1993, substituted 
"180 days" for "90 days" in Subsection (1), 
added Subsection (2), redesignating the follow 
ing subsections accordingly, inserted "county" 
in the first sentence in Subsection (5), subdi 
vided Subsection (6) and substituted "or" for 
"and" near the end of Subsection (6)(a), added 
Subsections (7) and (8), and made stylistic 
changes throughout 
